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Burning Our Lamps with
(Borrowed Oid
Lhce LiturgicaC Use of the (Psahns
and the Life of faith
‘Bpg‘Jacobson

>«-< friend of mine grew up as a pastor’s kid in the old Lutheran
&/// Free Church. For those who may not be acquainted with the
Lutheran Free Church, it was a tradition characterized by in
tense personal piety and tended to avoid rote prayers and liturgies. She
tells the story of a time when an old evangelist paid a visit to her home.
As they were sitting down to eat dinner, her father began the meal with
a prayer. He bowed his head, and began to recite a psalm. I suspect it
was Ps 145:15-16: “The eyes of all look to you, O Lord, and you give
them their food in due season. You open your hand, satisfying the de
sire of every living thing.” As he was in the midst of praying this psalm,
the visiting evangelist interrupted the prayer: “We thank you God,” he
intoned, “that we do not have to burn our lamps with borrowed oil.”
We thank you God that we do not have to burn our lamps with bor
rowed oil. With this pejorative slam, the evangelist dismissed liturgical
and prayer uses of the psalms. With all due respect, I am arguing here
that there is something salutary, there is something irreplaceable to be
gained when we use the psalms liturgically. Indeed, precisely because
some of us arrive at worship burned out, with no oil of our own re
maining in our reservoirs, we need to burn our lamps with borrowed
oil. And in the psalms such oil is to be found in plenty.
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Speaking Another’s Words

I wish to take as my departure points for this essay two simple obser
vations. The first observation is that in liturgical traditions that use the
Revised Common Lectionary, the Psalter is the only book of Scripture
that on an almost weekly basis is placed in the mouths of worshipers.
Every week there are four appointed readings: one from an Old Testa
ment book (except during the Easter season when the first reading is
taken from Acts), one from a psalm, one from an Epistle, and one from a
Gospel. In most congregations that use the Revised Common Lectionary,
the Old Testament, Epistle and Gospel readings are read to the congrega
tion, but the psalm is either read responsively by the congregation, or sung
responsively by the congregation. This practice creates an odd dynamic—
the congregation burns their lamps with borrowed oil as they speak the
words of ancient psalmists, as if they were their own words.
This leads to a second observation. Because many of the psalms are in
the first person singular or first person plural, when we place the words of
the psalms in worshipers’ mouths, we create a situation in which one sub
ject, one self, one “I,” speaks the emotionally and spiritually charged words
of another subject, another self, another “I.” But from this results an in
teresting thing: The emotions and thoughts of the first self might not be
at all consistent with the words of the other self that it is now speaking. Let
me offer several examples of the inconsistency I am imagining:
1. Imagine that a woman arrives for worship the day after her husband
died. She is feeling abandoned, alone, and frightened. The appointed
psalm is the twenty-third, so she finds herself saying: “The Lord is my
shepherd, I shall not want.... Even though I walk through the valley
of the shadow of death I shall fear no evil.”
2. Imagine that a college sophomore is home over break and his parents drag
him out of bed to worship. He doesn’t believe in God; he is sitting there
thinking what a lark this entire affair is. But the appointed psalm is 14, and
he finds himself saying, “Fools say in their hearts, ‘There is no God.’”

3. One more example. Imagine that on Saturday evening a young couple
gets engaged. They don’t walk into church the next morning, they float
in, their toes barely touching the steps as they climb the stairs, sharing
their joy with the worshiping community. The entire world is their oys
ter, but the psalm appointed for the day is Psalm 130. And so the two
young folks who are higher than a kite emotionally find themselves say
ing, “Out of the depths I cry to you, O Lord. Lord, hear my voice . . .
my soul waits for the Lord more than those who watch for the morning.”
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These three examples suffice to illustrate the phenomenon I am
getting at. Because many congregations use the psalms as liturgy, this
odd event occurs where a person speaks words in worship that are at
jarring odds with his or her own emotions. It is this disjunction, this
disconnect, between the words of the psalms and the emotions,
thoughts, and beliefs of the individual worshiper that I will investigate
in the remainder of this essay.
Let me state my thesis clearly. Either pastors, liturgists, and theolo
gians must learn to make fruitful use of this disjunction between the
emotions of the psalms and the emotions of the worshipers, or we will
simply reinforce for people that worship is meaningless. Think again of
the example of the sophomore atheist who is being forced to recite that
“fools say in their hearts, ‘There is no God.’” The imaginary young man
might simply find the irony of his recitation ludicrous, and it might just
drive him to become more cynical. But I believe that the tension be
tween the words that we place in worshipers mouths and the internal
emotional state of the worshipers can be put to creative pastoral and
theological use. And I believe that the theory of cognitive dissonance
can help us explore this gap and put it to fruitful use.

Cognitive Dissonance and the Psalms as Liturgy

Cognitive dissonance theory holds that the thoughts of individuals
need to be consistent and harmonious.1 When a person holds two or
more inconsistent thoughts, that person experiences a cognitive disso
nance. For example, a person thinks, “I hate driving” but that person has
a daily work commute of one hour. The person will try to resolve the un
comfortable cognitive dissonance, and some of the ways of doing so are:
1. Changing Attitude: The most common way to resolve a cognitive dis
sonance is for a person to changes attitudes. In my example the person
might decide, “I like [or don’t mind] driving.”
2. Adding New Thoughts: A second way to resolve a cognitive disso
nance is for a person to add a thought or cognition: “I hate driving, but
I am willing to drive to support my family.”
3. Changing Behavior: A person can also resolve a cognitive dissonance
by changing behaviors—get a new job, car pool, take public transporta
tion, arrange to work out of the home, get up earlier to shorten com
mute time, and so on.
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I believe that cognitive dissonance theory is helpful in thinking
about liturgical use of the Psalms, because cognitive dissonance does
not only happen naturally, cognitive dissonance can be intentionally
introduced into a subject in order to effect a change in behavior, a
change in attitude, or to force the addition of a new thought. It seems
to me that the introduction of a cognitive dissonance is exactly how
“the power of positive thinking” people affect their changes. Financial
self-help guru Suzie Orman tells people to stand in front of a mirror
and daily tell themselves, “I deserve to make $80,000.” The point is that
this new attitude is, of course, at dissonance with the life circumstances
of the person, so it is hoped that the person will change her behavior to
live up to the new attitude. Analogously, the liturgical use of the Psalms
can be employed to introduce new cognitions, new attitudes, and new
behaviors into worshipers.

The Liturgical Use of the Psalms and the Life of Faith

One of the tyrannies of our individualistic, western society is the
near deification of our emotions. The self-help television shows and
the insipid personal therapy culture constantly berate us to “get in
touch with your feelings,” and “own your emotions.” I was once even
told by a friend that “feelings are never wrong.” And at the time, I be
lieved her! Feelings are never wrong? Of course they are—hatred, envy,
lust, despite, jealousy, insecurity, greed, greed, greed!—of course feel
ings can be wrong. But in our society, emotions have been elevated to
such an infallible height that the individual is often left in bondage to
his or her own emotions.
But this individual comes to worship, and in worship, this individual
can be led to recite the psalms. In this fashion we can use this recitation as
an opportunity to introduce a cognitive dissonance into the individual.
Thus to the person who is buried under a mountain of sadness, the dis
sonant cognition can be introduced: “I will give thanks to the Lord with
my whole heart” (Ps 111:1). To the person who feels in control of their life,
the dissonant cognition can be introduced: “Be gracious to me, O God, for
people trample on me” (Ps 56:1). The words clash with the effect. How
ever, the resolution of the dissonance may in fact alter the effect.
In the space I have left, I wish to explore two dimensions of the theo
logical possibilities of what I have been describing. I will interact with
Walter Brueggemann’s well-known theological typology for appropriat
ing the psalms as he laid it out in his article, “Psalms and the Life of
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Faith: A Suggested Typology of Function.”2 As is well known, Brueggemann drew on the work of Paul Ricoeur and proposed that there are
psalms of orientation, psalms of disorientation, and psalms of reorienta
tion. I wish stress a point that Brueggemann made in his article:
Brueggemann’s theological typology of function was never meant to re
place or ignore the form-critical categories of praise, lament, or thanks
giving. Brueggemann has been misread by some as offering a rival
typology to the form-critical categories. But as Brueggemann wrote:
Our consideration offunction must of course be based on the best judg
ments we have about form and setting in life. The present discussion assumes
and fully values both the method and the gains of form-critical study. It pro
vides neither a criticism nor a displacement of form-critical work.3

Precisely because Brueggemann’s typology is a hermeneutical ap
propriation of the psalm texts, I have found it ideal to help think
through the possibility of using the psalms liturgically to introduce
cognitive dissonances into the worshiping congregants.

Introducing Cognitions of Disorientation to the Oriented
Drawing on the thought of Paul Ricoeur, Brueggemann proposed
that “the sequence of orientation-disorientation-reorientation is a helpful
way to understand the use and function of the Psalms.”4 Orientation is
the (artificial?) starting point for this sequence. That is, orientation
marks a state of stability and comfort from which the subject begins and
to which the subject desires to return. Brueggemann assigns certain
creation psalms, wisdom psalms, descriptive praise psalms, and psalms
of ascent to this state. These include Psalms 1, 37,105,19, 127,128,131,
133, and 145. Brueggemann describes orientation as the “mind-set and
worldview of those who enjoy a serene location . . . characterized by
orderliness, goodness, and reliability of life.”5 In this state, good is re
warded and evil is punished. Creation functions in an orderly manner,
chaos is not a threat. Those who fear the Lord are not persecuted by the
wicked. The economy is good; husbands don’t leave wives; children are
not born with birth defects; those who work hard enjoy promotion re
gardless of their race, gender, or social status. And, most importantly,
God is utterly and unquestionably reliable and present.
My experience as a pastor was that on any given Sunday, a signifi
cant portion of those worshiping in the pews did so from a state of ori
entation. They were in a state of orientation not because they were
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dim-witted, or because they were wicked, but simply because life for
them was good at the moment. They had not recently experienced what
Ricoeur calls a limit experience, they were not currently in a state of
dislocation.
For several reasons, it would be pastorally irresponsible for pastors
and worship leaders to abandon their congregants in this state of ori
entation. First, we know that the state of orientation is not permanent.
As one teacher once said, “Because I am a Christian, I know that things
are going to get worse.” The state of orientation is impermanent; life is
finite, and this finitude must come to knock on every door and call on
every child of God. Because disorientation is coming, pastors and liturgists should try to equip parishioners against the day it arrives. Second,
at any given moment some of our brothers and sisters in the family of
God are in a state of disorientation. One of the most goading thorns in
the flesh of a sufferer is proximity to those who do not suffer. Think of
Job, whose contact with his so-called friends inflamed his wounds and
increased his burdens. Think of the suffering lament psalmist, who in
suffering, experiences her brothers and sisters as problematic. For the
lamenting psalmist, community is not the answer but precisely the
problem. The pastor or liturgist owes it to those who are currently in a
state of disorientation to disorient the oriented.
One way to do this is to place words of disorientation in the mouth
of the congregation by using a lament psalm liturgically. The pastoral
goal here would be to introduce a dissonant cognition of disorientation
into an oriented person’s mind in the hopes that this new thought
would eventually be a catalyst that would cause the person to add new
cognitions and new attitudes. For example, one of the hallmarks of the
state of orientation is the belief set forth in Ps 1:6: “the Lord watches
over the way of the righteous, but the way of the wicked will perish.”
But what if the liturgy invited the worshiper to speak the first words of
Psalm 22: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? Why are you
so far from helping me, from the words of my groaning? O my God, cry
by day, but you do not answer me.” The worshiper now has two disso
nant cognitions: (1) The Lord watches over the way of the righteous;
but (2) My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? Not especially
that the first person language—“My God, my God,” “forsaken me,” “I
cry by day, but you do not answer me”—invites the worshiper to make
this phrase even more intimately her own cognition.
Brueggemann wrote: “The psalms of lament both individual and
corporate, are ways of entering linguistically into a new distressful
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situation in which the old orientation has collapsed.”6 It is specifically
the pregnant power of liturgy as a linguistic event to which I wish to
draw attention. Because liturgy places words in the mouth of people,
liturgy has an added creative capacity and an extra measure of herme
neutical leverage that sermons and lectures and reading do not.7 It is
easy for the mind to distance itself from the theoretical, abstract words
in a sermon in which the pastor may seek to teach worshipers about the
reality of suffering, but the mind’s defenses will be much more vulnera
ble when it speaks phrases in the first person. “My God, why have you
forsaken me.” Once such words become my own, once they sink into my
heart and mind and soul, it will be impossible for these words to coexist
peacefully with the stable cognitions of orientation.
Recall that two of the main ways that the human mind resolves cog
nitive dissonances are to add new cognitions and to change attitudes.
In the present example, the pastoral goal might be something of both.
Perhaps the person in a happy state of orientation might add the new
cognition, “Sometimes the righteous do suffer.” Or a different new cog
nition might be added, such as: “Perhaps suffering is not a sign of per
sonal failure.” Accompanying these new cognitions there may be a new
attitude towards those who suffer. Rather than judging sufferers or
fearing them, compassion and love might take seed. Such newly added
cognitions or newly changed attitudes could serve the subject well also,
in the inevitable event of his own suffering. The day of dislocation calls
on us all; perhaps we would be better equipped to face it if we already
owned the words of disorientation as our own.
Introducing Cognitions of Orientation to the Disorientated

If orientation is the stable starting point for Brueggemann’s suggested
sequence of orientation-disorientation-reorientation, then disorientation
is an inevitable stage of instability through which every life must pass. Just
as psalms of disorientation can be placed in the mouths of those who are
firm in their orientation, psalms of reorientation can be placed Iiturgically
in the mouths of the disoriented in order to introduce new cognitions.
Earlier I stressed the nature of the psalms of disorientation as lin
guistic events. I wish to repeat that stress here in my treatment of the
psalms of reorientation. As words of reorientation are placed into the
mouths and thus entered into the hearts and minds of the disoriented,
they do more than simply teach the sufferer a new lesson, they do more
than simply give expression to the sufferer’s experience. Rather, the
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words of reorientation create a new life for the sufferer, they evoke new
horizons. In the words of the New Testament, they raise the dead.
At this point, perhaps I might be allowed to share a personal expe
rience. As a teenager, I was gravely ill with cancer. Both of my legs were
amputated, and I underwent a litany of other treatments. In those
years, Ps 27:1 became my favorite Bible verse.
“The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The
Lord is the stronghold of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?” The verse
gave me hope when I had little. The verse gave me confidence when all
I had was fear. To be frank, I was very afraid in those years. This verse,
which speaks of having no fear, did not match my experience. Indeed it
was contrary to my experience! But these words transformed my expe
rience; they created hope.
When the liturgy places the words of psalms of reorientation8 into
the mouths of sufferers, it can introduce a new cognition that one
hopes might destabilize the experience of the worshiper. Perhaps a wor
shiper is thinking, “I feel abandoned and alone.” But then the worshiper
might find herself speaking the familiar words of Psalm 23: “You are
with me; your rod and your staff—they comfort me.” Or of Psalm 121:
“My help comes from the Lord, who made heaven and earth.” The two
cognitions are dissonant—I am alone and you are with me—and the
human mind will seek to resolve this dissonance: either by changing
cognitions, adding new cognitions, or changing attitudes.
Conclusion

I have argued in this essay that a theory of cognitive dissonance
lends us a hermeneutical tool to help think about the liturgical use of
the psalms and the life of faith. In conclusion, I offer four brief obser
vations and caveats:
1. The process I describe does not, of course, apply only to the liturgical
use of the psalms, but to the rest of the liturgy as well. It would apply to
the confession and absolution, the kyrie, the offertory, and so on. But be
cause the language of the Psalter encompasses both the heights and
depths of human experience, and because the weekly Psalter is expressly
a scriptural lesson, it seems to me that the analysis is especially fruitful
for thinking about the liturgical use of the psalms.

2. The type of cognitive dissonance I am envisioning is not likely to
occur after a single recitation of a psalm. In fact, I think the opposite.
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Most likely, it is only the week-in-and-week-out reading of the psalms
that is likely to be able to introduce a dissonant cognition into a person.
But that is why we worship weekly, and that is why we have the annual
liturgical calendar.

3. The type of analysis I outline here need not be limited to liturgy. I can
imagine pastoral care and catechetical applications of this theory.
4. Given the space and time limitations afforded me, what I have offered
here is simply an overture and not a thorough analysis.

NOTES: CHAPTER 6
1 For the purpose of this essay, I am interacting only with an overview of cognitive
dissonance theory. For more information on the theory, see the following: E. Aronson
and J. Mills, “The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group,” Journal ofAb
normal and Social Psychology 59 (1959) 177-78 1; L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance (1959); L. Festinger and J. Carlsmith, “Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance,” Journal ofAbnormal and Social Psychology 58 (1959) 203-10; L. Festinger,
H. W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study
of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World (1956).
2 In The Psalms and the Life of Faith, Patrick D. Miller, ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1995) 3-32.
3 Ibid., 3-4.
4 Ibid., 9.
5 Ibid., 10.
6 Ibid., 11.
7 In my understanding of the psalms as linguistic events that can create new realities,
and specifically in my understanding of the liturgical use of psalms to introduce new cog
nitions into the minds of worshipers, I maybe going slightly beyond Brueggemann. Fie fo
cuses on the power of psalms to express present reality: “This creative, evocative function
of language is precisely what is at work in the Psalms. The Psalms transmit to us ways of
speaking that are appropriate to the extremities of human experience as known concretely
in Israel. Or, to use Ricoeur’s language, we have ‘limit-expressions’ (laments, sons of cele
bration) that match ‘limit experiences’ (disorientation, reorientation)” [Ibid., 27). While
Brueggemann focuses on “matching” the expression to the experience, I am arguing that
an expression that is precisely contrary to present experience may be introduced in order
to initiate a change in experience. It seems to me that this is faithful to Brueggemann’s ap
propriation of the psalms, but it takes Brueggemann in a slightly different direction.
8 Brueggemann (following Westermann) identifies especially psalms of declarative
praise as psalms of reorientation. That is, those psalms that speak of having come
through some period of dislocation are psalms of reorientation. This distinction seems
correct to me.

